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Moran 1

UNDER THE GUN: WILL STATES’ ONE-GUN-PER-MONTH LAWS PASS CONSTITUTIONAL
MUSTER AFTER HELLER AND MCDONALD?
By Caroline Moran
INTRODUCTION
In the early morning hours of December 12, 2011, New York City police officers
responded to a reported robbery taking place in a Brooklyn basement.1 Unbeknownst to the
officers, the robbers were still in the basement, hiding in the shadows behind them.2 The robbers,
attempting to evade the officers, tried to slip away unnoticed through a back door.3 They were
met, however, by two other police officers at the door who had just arrived to provide backup
support to the officers at the scene.4 Surprised at the sight of the two additional officers, one the
robbers took out his gun and shot Officer Peter Figoski in the face.5 Officer Figoski later died in
the hospital.6 The gunman, Lamont Pride, had used an illegal gun that police later traced back to
Virginia.7
This is not at all uncommon in New York City, where 85% of the guns used in crimes come
from out-of-state, and 90% of those guns are illegal.8 According to the office of Mayor Michael
Bloomberg, Virginia is the number one exporter of guns that are used in commission of crimes in
New York City, and one of the “top suppliers nationally.”9 Thus, it was distressing to many,
including Mayor Bloomberg, when Governor Bob McDonnell of Virginia announced that the
1

Michael Wilson, In Dark Brooklyn Doorway, Officer Confronts Gunman, and Dies, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2011, at
A1.
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
Tina Moore & Bill Hutchinson, Mayor Bloomberg criticizes Virginia repeal of 20-year-old gun law, N.Y. DAILY
NEWS (Mar. 1, 2012), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/mayor-bloomberg-criticizes-virginia-repeal-20-yearold-gun-law-article-1.1031149.
8
Kirsten Gillibrand, End the Flow of Illegal Guns, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 9, 2013),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rep-kirsten-gillibrand/end-the-flow-of-illegal-g_b_2440791.html.
9
Moore and Hutchinson, supra note 7.
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state was repealing its one-gun-per-month law in March of 2012.10 One-gun-per-month laws
seek to prevent the export of guns from states with weaker firearms regulations to states with
stricter firearms regulations through the means of a “straw” purchaser who buys guns in bulk and
then resells them on the street.11 The law does so by limiting the number of guns that an
individual may purchase to one every thirty days.12
Though Virginia has repealed its one-gun-per-month law, legislatures in Maryland,13
California,14 and, most recently, New Jersey have enacted their own versions of one-gun-permonth laws in order to combat the illegal transfer of firearms.15 Studies indicate that one-gunper-month laws, where implemented, have been successful in reducing interstate firearms
trafficking.16 Governor McDonnell and other gun rights advocates, however, argue that these
laws unconstitutionally burden citizens’ Second Amendment right to bear arms, a right which
was recently reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in District of Columbia v. Heller17 in 2008 and
McDonald v. City of Chicago in 2010.18 As a result of Heller and McDonald, much of the
existing state gun control legislation in the United States has been called into question.19 Lower
courts have upheld a wide variety of gun control laws, such as felon-in-possession bans and bans

10

Id.
Douglas S. Weil & Rebecca C. Knox, Effects of Limiting Handgun Purchases on Interstate Transfer of Firearms,
JAMA 1759, 1759-60 (1996).
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Id.
13
MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 5-128(b) (LexisNexis 2011).
14
CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 26835(f), 27535(a) (West 2012).
15
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:58-2, 2C:58-3 (West 2011).
16
Weil & Knox, supra note 11, at 1759-61; Christopher S. Koper, Crime Gun Risks Factors: Buyer, Seller, Firearm,
and the Transaction Characteristics Associated with Gun Trafficking and Criminal Gun Use: Report to the National
Institute of Justice, Philadelphia, PA: Jerry Lee Center of Criminology (2007): 1-96, available at
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/221074.pdf.
17
554 U.S. 570 (2008).
18
130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
19
Adam Winkler, The New Second Amendment: A Bark Worse Than Its Right, THE HUFFINGTON POST, Jan. 2, 2009,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/adam-winkler/the-new-second-amendment_b_154783.html.
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on carrying weapons in sensitive places, without much difficulty.20 However, neither Heller nor
McDonald provided guidance to lower courts on how they should evaluate gun control laws, and
so the future of gun control legislation remains unclear until the Supreme Court articulates a
standard of review for implementing the Second Amendment.
After a brief examination of the history of Second Amendment jurisprudence in the United
States in Part I, Part II of this Note will address the Supreme Court decisions in Heller and
McDonald. In Part III, this Note will analyze how lower courts have addressed constitutional
claims against gun control laws in the wake of Heller and McDonald and in the absence of
guidance from the Supreme Court on what standard of review to apply. Finally, in Part IV this
Note will conclude that intermediate scrutiny is the proper standard under which Second
Amendment challenges to gun control laws should be reviewed, and, under this standard, onegun-per-month laws pass constitutional muster.
PART I: HISTORY OF SECOND AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE PRIOR TO HELLER AND
MCDONALD: AN INDIVIDUAL OR COLLECTIVE RIGHT?
The recent push for passage of gun control laws as a response to increasing concern over
gun-related violence, coupled with the backlash from gun right advocates, has pushed the
disagreement about the scope of the Second Amendment to the fore where, today, it is a source
of particular contention that can hardly be ignored.21 However, it was not always the case that the
Second Amendment was a source of hotly contested debate.22 Indeed, prior to the Heller and

20

See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 604 F. Supp. 2d 1162, 1168 (W.D. Tenn. 2009); United States v. Masciandaro,
638 F.3d 458 (4th Cir. 2011).
21
Id.
22
Silveira v. Lockyer, 312 F.3d 1052, 1060 (9th Cir. 2002).

Moran 4
McDonald era, the Second Amendment was a “relatively obscure constitutional provision” that
“attracted little judicial or scholarly attention.”23
The debate surrounding the Second Amendment has historically focused on whether it
protects an individual right to “keep and bear arms,” or whether it merely protects a collective
right of state militia to maintain firearms “free from federal interference.”24 Three basic schools
of thought have emerged: (1) the “traditional individual right” model, (2) the “limited individual
right” model, and (3) the “collective right” model.25 Proponents of the “traditional individual
right” model contend that the Second Amendment guarantees individual private citizens a
fundamental right to keep and bear arms for any purpose. 26 The second view holds that
individuals have a constitutional right to possess firearms when it is “reasonably related” to
militia service.27 The third approach asserts that the Second Amendment right to bear arms
guarantees only the right of the people to maintain state militias, and does not confer any
individual right to keep and maintain firearms.28 Prior to the decision handed down by the
Supreme Court in Heller, the dominant view of the Second Amendment, and the one most
widely accepted by lower courts, was the “collective right” model, and it was not until recently
that this view came under increasing attack by advocates of the individual right theory.29 There
was, however, no Supreme Court-endorsed view of the Second Amendment, and the lower
courts were left to themselves to determine the scope of the right to bear arms.30

23

Id.
Adam Winkler, Scrutinizing the Second Amendment, 105 MICH. L. REV. 683, 684 (2007).
25
Id.
26
Id.
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Id.
28
Silveira, 312 F.3d at 1060.
29
Id.
30
Id.
24
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In the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court limited its analysis of the Second
Amendment simply to say that it was not applicable to state or local governments.31 In United
States v. Cruikshank, the Court dismissed criminal charges brought against two men who
allegedly denied their fellow citizens their right to “bear[] arms for a lawful purpose.”32 More
importantly, the Court announced that the Second Amendment “means no more than it shall not
be infringed by Congress, [and] has no other effect than to restrict the power of the national
government.”33 Then, eleven years later in Presser v. Illinois, the Supreme Court affirmed its
decision in Cruikshank, and upheld an Illinois ban against citizen participation in an
“unauthorized militia.”34 Not until 1939 did the Second Amendment receive any extensive
treatment by the Supreme Court, and still it was nothing more than a “cryptic discussion” of the
scope of the right to bear arms.35 In United States v. Miller, the Court considered a Second
Amendment challenge to the National Firearms Act of 1934, which prohibited the transportation
of unregistered short-barreled shotguns over state lines.36 Because there was no evidence that the
short-barreled shotgun was “any part of the ordinary military equipment or that its use could
contribute to the common defense,” the Second Amendment did not guarantee the right to
possess such a firearm.37 In so holding, the Supreme Court went on to conclude that the right to
bear arms must have “some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well
regulated militia,” with the “obvious purpose to assure the continuation and render possible the

31

United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
Id. at 542, 556-67.
33
Id. at 542.
34
116 U.S. 252, 264-65 (1886). The Court also noted that the ban would not have violated the Second Amendment
even if it did apply to the states. Id.
35
Silveira, 312 F.3d at 1060.
36
307 U.S. 174, 175-76 (1939).
37
Id. at 178.
32
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effectiveness” of the power of Congress to raise a militia.38 The Second Amendment, the Court
said, “must be interpreted and applied with that end in view.”39 Thus, in the years that followed
Miller, a majority of lower courts used the decision to support the collective right view of the
Second Amendment and uphold various gun control measures.40
The Supreme Court did not reference the scope of the Second Amendment again until
1980 in Lewis v. United States, where it noted, in a footnote dismissing a Second Amendment
challenge to the federal felon-in-possession ban, that federal gun control laws such as the one at
issue, did not “trench upon any constitutionally protected liberties,” and it cited Miller to support
its view.41 The Court summarized Miller’s holding as protecting “no right to keep and bear a
firearm that does not have ‘some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a
well-regulated militia.’”42 Thus, similar to its decision in Miller, the Supreme Court in Lewis
implicitly rejected the traditional individual right model in favor of the collective right view.43
It was not until the second half of the twentieth century that the collective right view was
called into question. A new wave of academic scholarship emerged that supported the individual
right view of the Second Amendment, and it began to hold sway in a few lower courts.44 In 2001,
the Fifth Circuit explicitly adopted the traditional individual right approach, the first circuit court

38

Id.; accord U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 15 (“The Congress shall have the Power . . . To provide for calling forth
the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections, and repel Invasions . . . . ”)
39
Miller, 307 U.S. at 178.
40
See, e.g., United States v. Haney, 264 F.3d 1161, 1165 (10th Cir. 2001) (citing Miller to support its holding that a
“federal criminal gun-control law does not violate the Second Amendment unless it impairs the state’s ability to
maintain a well-regulated militia”); Gillespie v. City of Indianapolis, 185 F.3d 693, 710 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting that
“Miller and its progeny do confirm that the Second Amendment establishes no right to possess a firearm apart from
the role possession of the gun might play in maintaining a state militia”); United States v. Rybar, 103 F.3d 273, 286
(3d Cir. 1996) (declaring that “the Miller Court . . . demanded a reasonable relationship between [a weapon’s]
‘possession or use’ and militia-related activity” (quoting Miller, 307 U.S. at 178)).
41
445 U.S. 55, 65 n.8 (1980).
42
Id. (quoting Miller, 307 U.S. at 178).
43
Silveira, 312 F.3d at 1061-62.
44
Id.; see also Winkler, supra note 24, at 684 (noting that a number of influential legal scholars have criticized the
collective right view and endorsed the individual right theory).
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to do so.45 In United States v. Emerson, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals declared that the
Second Amendment protects an individual’s right to keep and bear arms for personal use.46 It
held that “[t]he plain meaning of the right to keep arms is that it is an individual, rather than a
collective, right and is not limited to keeping arms while engaged in active military service.”47
Following the lead of the Fifth Circuit, the District of Columbia Circuit Court struck down a gun
control law because it violated the Second Amendment, finding that the Amendment conferred
an individual right to bear arms in Parker v. District of Columbia (renamed District of Columbia
v. Heller upon appeal to the Supreme Court).48 This case would later prove to be the impetus that
drove the Supreme Court to deal with the Second Amendment directly and formally announce its
view of the scope of the Amendment.
PART II: HELLER AND MCDONALD ESTABLISH AN INDIVIDUAL RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR
ARMS IN THE HOME FOR SELF-DEFENSE
Like the District of Columbia Circuit Court below, the Supreme Court adopted the
individual right approach when it struck down the District of Columbia gun regulation in
Heller.49 The law was one that, in the Court’s words, “totally ban[ned] handgun possession. . . .
[and] amount[ed] to a prohibition of an entire class of ‘arms’ that is overwhelmingly chosen by
American society for [the] lawful purpose [of self-defense],” which is an “inherent right. . . .
central to the Second Amendment . . . .”50 To be sure, the law was one of the most restrictive gun

45

United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 260 (5th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 259-60. It should be noted that the court nevertheless upheld the gun control law at issue, a ban on
possession by domestic violence misdemeanants.
47
Id. at 232.
48
Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 391 (D.C. Cir. 2007), aff’d sub nom. District of Columbia v. Heller,
554 U.S. 570 (2008).
49
554 U.S. at 635.
50
Id. at 626-27.
46
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control measures in the country.51 It banned possession of handguns and required all other
firearms to be kept in the home where they had to be trigger-locked or disassembled.52 The
Supreme Court, after conducting a lengthy inquiry into the construction of the text of the Second
Amendment and its historical context, concluded that it “conferred an individual right to keep
and bear arms,”53 and this right extends to “all Americans,” not just members of a militia.54
Therefore, the Court held, all citizens must be able to keep and use firearms “for the core lawful
purpose of self-defense.”55 Because the home is “where the need for defense of self, family, and
property is most acute,” the District of Columbia’s “absolute prohibition of handguns held and
used for self-defense in the home” was unconstitutional.56 With this, the Supreme Court
explicitly endorsed the individual right view of the Second Amendment.
Nevertheless, the Court was careful to clarify that its holding in Heller did not invalidate
the numerous gun control laws already in place.57 The Second Amendment, the Court
emphasized, is “not unlimited” and is “not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in
any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose.”58 The Court provided a list of various gun
control regulations—called by some scholars the “Heller safe harbor”—that do not infringe on
the Second Amendment right to bear arms.59 Taking a historical approach, the Court noted that
most nineteenth century courts held concealed carry laws valid under the Second Amendment or

51

Id. at 629 (commenting that “[f]ew laws in the history of our Nation have come close to the severe restriction of
the District’s handgun ban”).
52
Id. at 635.
53
Id. at 595.
54
Id. at 581.
55
Heller, 554 U.S. at 630.
56
Id. at 636.
57
Id. at 626.
58
Id.
59
Brannon P. Denning & Glenn H. Reynolds, Heller, High Water(mark)? Lower Courts and the New Right to Keep
and Bear Arms, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1245, 1248 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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state constitutions.60 Those holdings would not be called into question because of the Court’s
decision in Heller.61 Similarly, the “longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by
felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places . . .or
laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms” were all
presumptively lawful under the Second Amendment.62 The Court further qualified this list of
exceptions by asserting that it merely provided “examples” of permissible regulations, and it was
not meant to be “exhaustive.”63
Two years later in McDonald, the Supreme Court again held that the Second Amendment
guaranteed the individual’s right to keep and bear arms in the home for self-defense, and it
further extended this right by applying it to the states by virtue of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.64 In McDonald, plaintiffs challenged a Chicago municipal law that
banned individuals from possessing firearms unless they had a valid registration certificate.65
The law prohibited the registration of most handguns, effectively banning handguns in the city.66
The plaintiffs also challenged an Oak Park, Illinois, ban that held it “unlawful for any person to
possess . . . any firearm.”67 The Supreme Court affirmed its holding in Heller that the Second
Amendment is an individual right to keep and bear arms in the home for self-defense purposes.68
The Court held that self-defense is a “basic right” recognized by our legal system, and selfdefense is the “central component” of the Second Amendment.69 The right to bear arms, the

60

Heller, 554 U.S. at 626.
Id.
62
Id. at 626-27.
63
Id. at 627 n.26.
64
130 S. Ct. at 3026.
65
Id.
66
Id. (citing Chicago, Ill. Municipal Code § 8-20-050(c)).
67
Id. (quoting Oak Park, Ill. Municipal Code § 27-2-1 (2007); 27-1-1 (2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
68
Id. at 3036.
69
Id.
61
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Court reasoned, is “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and traditions,”70 and is one that the
Founding Fathers deemed important enough to warrant constitutional protection.71 Thus, a
plurality of the Supreme Court concluded that the Second Amendment right is a “fundamental”
one, and, as such, the Amendment should be incorporated under the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process Clause and made applicable to the states.72
However, the McDonald plurality, like the Heller majority, found that the Second
Amendment is not unlimited, and its decision did not “cast doubt” on the constitutionality of the
“longstanding regulatory measures” highlighted in Heller.73 Moreover, the plurality made clear
that incorporation “does not imperil every law regulating firearms.”74 The plurality further noted
that state and local experimentation with “reasonable firearms regulations” should continue.75
Like Heller, McDonald focused on the right of handgun possession in the home. The McDonald
Court noted that self-defense is “the central component of the Second Amendment right,” and it
stressed that the need to exercise that right is “most acute” in the home to protect “self, family,
and property.”76
Perhaps just as important as what the Supreme Court said in Heller and McDonald is
what it did not say. Although the Court finally adopted the individual right approach to the
Second Amendment when it affirmed the individual’s right to keep and bear arms in the home

70

McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3036 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
71
Id. at 3036-37.
72
Id. at 3050 (plurality opinion). Though a majority of the Supreme Court agreed that the Second Amendment
applied to the states, the Court could not agree on which provision of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated it.
Justice Alito, writing for the plurality, held that the Due Process Clause incorporated the Second Amendment. Id.
Justice Thomas, concurring in the judgment, held that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause
made the Second Amendment applicable to the states. Id. at 3059 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment).
73
Id. at 3047.
74
Id.
75
Id. at 3046.
76
McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3036 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 628).
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for self-defense purposes, it did little more than that.77 Neither Heller nor McDonald endorsed a
standard of review that lower courts should use in evaluating gun control legislation.78 In the
Heller majority opinion, Justice Scalia said only what level of scrutiny would not apply: rational
basis review.79 Such a lenient standard, Justice Scalia noted, would be wholly inappropriate for a
“specific, enumerated right” like the right to bear arms.80 Justice Scalia similarly rejected an
“interest balancing” approach as inappropriate, an approach advocated by Justice Breyer in his
dissent, which would weigh the individual’s right to bear arms with the state’s interest in
promoting public safety.81 Instead, Justice Scalia simply stated that future challenges to gun
control legislation will determine the scope of the Second Amendment and the standard of
review that ought to apply.82 Similarly, in McDonald, the plurality rejected Justice Breyer’s
“interest balancing” approach, but did not identify which standard of review ought to be used.83
It said only that “reasonable” gun control legislation would be permissible.84
Nevertheless, the impact of Heller and McDonald should not be underestimated. These
cases have spawned an overwhelming number of Second Amendment lawsuits and legal claims
since the Supreme Court handed them down, and the constitutionality of gun control laws
remains far from clear without a Supreme Court-endorsed standard of review.85

77

See id. at 3050 (plurality opinion) (rejecting an interest-balancing approach advocated by Justice Breyer in Heller,
but declining to propose an alternative standard for reviewing gun control regulations); see also Heller, 554 U.S. at
634-36 (recognizing the dissent’s criticism that the majority did not settle on a standard of review for gun control
regulations, but concluding that “since this case represents this Court’s first in-depth examination of the Second
Amendment, one should not expect it to clarify the entire field.”).
78
Heller, 554 U.S. at 634-36.
79
Id. at 628.
80
Id.
81
Id. at 689-90 (Breyer, J., dissenting); id. at 634 (“We know of no other enumerated constitutional right whose core
protection has been subjected to a freestanding ‘interest-balancing’ approach.”).
82
Id. at 635.
83
Id.
84
Id. at 3046.
85
Dennis A. Henigan, The Heller Paradox, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1171, 1199-1200 (2009).
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PART III: JUDICIAL REVIEW OF GUN CONTROL LEGISLATION POST-HELLER AND MCDONALD
As noted above, gun advocates have initiated hundreds of lawsuits since Heller and
McDonald, and lower courts have yet to settle on which standard of review is proper in
reviewing Second Amendment challenges.86 While most courts have applied intermediate
scrutiny,87 other courts have used strict scrutiny, a reasonableness standard, or even a hybrid of
strict and intermediate scrutiny.88 However, while the review of gun control legislation has been
inconsistent, the result has been the same: challenged gun control laws have almost always
survived constitutional scrutiny, regardless of the test applied.89
A. Gun Control Legislation in the Heller “Safe Harbor”
The Supreme Court in Heller made clear that its decision did not call into question
“longstanding prohibitions” on gun possession, such as those on the possession of firearms by
felons and the mentally ill, laws banning guns in sensitive places such as schools and
government buildings, and laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale
of firearms.90 Heller also explicitly approved of the “historical tradition of prohibiting the
carrying of dangerous and unusual weapons.”91 As a result, challenges to the gun control laws
that fit into Justice Scalia’s list of Heller exceptions have been easily dismissed by lower court
judges, sometimes “with gusto.”92 For instance, a number of federal courts have upheld felon-in-

86

See United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 688-89 (4th Cir. 2010) (noting that “Heller has left in its wake a
morass of conflicting lower court opinions regarding the proper analysis to apply to challenged firearms
regulations”).
87
See, e.g., GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Georgia, No. 5:10-CV-302 (CAR), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6370, at *31 (M.D.
Ga. Jan. 24, 2011) (“This Court joins the majority of other courts and concludes that intermediate scrutiny is the
appropriate standard of scrutiny for this case.”); see also Heller II, 698 F. Supp. 2d 179, 186 (D.D.C. 2010).
88
Tina Mehr & Adam Winkler, Am. Constitution Soc’y, The Standardless Second Amendment, 2-7 (Oct. 2010),
http://www.acslaw.org/files/Mehr%20and%C20Winkler%C20Standardless%C20Second%Amednment.pdf.
89
Id.
90
Heller, 554 U.S. at 626-27.
91
Id. at 627 (internal quotation marks omitted).
92
Denning & Reynolds, supra note 59, at 1248.
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possession bans in the wake of Heller.93 As one court that considered a challenge to the ban
noted, “[t]here is no wiggle room to distinguish the present case from the Supreme Court’s
blanket [presumptively lawful] statement.”94 Similarly, bans on possession by the mentally ill
have survived Second Amendment challenges.95 The Heller Court’s approval of the tradition of
prohibiting dangerous and unusual weapons has been cited when upholding a ban on assault
weapons as well.96 So too has the Court’s endorsement of bans of firearms in “sensitive places”
led lower courts to reject challenges to the Gun Free School Zone Act (“GFSZA”)97 and bans on
possession of firearms at post offices.98 Recently, lower courts have expanded this “sensitive
place” category beyond schools and government buildings to include county property,99 national
parks,100 and airports.101
Lower courts have also upheld gun control measures not specifically mentioned in
Heller, relying on a footnote in Justice Scalia’s majority opinion that cautions that his list of
“presumptively lawful regulatory gun measures” was not meant to be “exhaustive,” but merely to
provide examples of the types of laws that do not pose a challenge to the Second Amendment.102
Courts have, for example, upheld bans on gun possession by illegal drug users because such bans
93

See, e.g., United States v. Anderson, 559 F.3d 348, 352 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2814 (2009); United
States v. Bronson, 292 F. App’x 259, 261 (4th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (unpublished); United States v. Miller, 604 F.
Supp. 2d 1162, 1168 (W.D. Tenn. 2009).
94
United States v. Schultz, No. 10:08-Cr-75-TS, 2009 Dist. LEXIS 234, at *5 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 5, 2009).
95
See, e.g., United States v. McRobie, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 617, at *1 (4th Cir. Jan. 14, 2009) (per curiam)
(rejecting a challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4), which bans possession of firearms by individuals who have been
committed to a mental institution).
96
See Heller II, 698 F. Supp. 2d at 194-95 (holding that the District of Columbia’s firearms registration process,
prohibition of assault weapons, and prohibition of large capacity ammunition feeding devices was constitutional
following the majority’s opinion in Heller).
97
18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A) (2006); Denning & Reynolds, supra note 59, at 1252 (citing United States v. Lewis, No.
2008-45, 2008 WL 5412012, at *2 (D.V.I. Dec. 24, 2008)(where the court stated that “Heller unambiguously
forecloses a Second Amendment challenge to the [GFSZA] under any level of scrutiny”)).
98
Id. (citing United States v. Dorosan, No. 08-042, 2008 WL 2622996, at *6 (E.D. La. June 30, 2008)).
99
Nordyke v. King, 563 F.3d 439, 459-60 (9th Cir. 2009).
100
United States v. Masciandaro, 648 F. Supp. 2d 779, 790-91 (E.D. Va. 2009), aff’d, No. 09-4839, 2011 U.S. App.
LEXIS 5964 (4th Cir. Mar. 24, 2011).
101
New York v. Ferguson, No. 2008QN036911, 2008 WL 4694552, at *4 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. Oct. 24, 2008).
102
Heller, 554 U.S. at 627 n.26.
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are the functional equivalent of felon-in-possession bans, which were explicitly mentioned in
Heller as permissible.103 Other courts have found bans on possession by domestic violence
misdemeanants constitutional, again reasoning that these individuals are analogous to felons, and
so such bans are in line with the examples of “presumptively lawful” regulations in Heller.104
B. Lower Courts Search for the Proper Standard of Review for Gun Control Legislation
The line of cases above indicates that lower courts have overwhelmingly upheld gun
control legislation. However, they have done so by employing different standards of review.105 A
few courts, such as the Seventh Circuit, have analyzed (and upheld) gun control laws without
employing or endorsing any of the traditional constitutional standards of review.106 Nevertheless,
most courts reviewing regulations have chosen to explicitly endorse a standard of review, but
with varying results. Some have adopted strict scrutiny;107 a few others have applied a less
conventional hybrid of strict and intermediate scrutiny review or a reasonableness test.108 The
103

See, e.g., United States v. Yancey, 621 F.3d 681, 684 (7th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (finding that 18 U.S.C. §
922(g)(3), prohibiting unlawful drug users from possessing guns, is constitutional); United States v. Seay, 620 F.3d
919, 920 (8th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1027 (2010).
104
See, e.g., United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 640 (7th Cir. 2009), vacated en banc, 614 F.3d 638 (7th Cir.
2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1674 (2011); United States v. Booker, 570 F. Supp. 2d 161, 164-65 (D. Me. 2008)
(holding that because domestic violence misdemeanants have been convicted of violent crimes, they ought to be
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majority of courts, however, have used intermediate scrutiny in evaluating gun control
regulations.109
A few courts have adopted strict scrutiny to review gun control regulations,110 but even
these courts have upheld gun control legislation in every case.111 For instance, a federal district
court faced with a challenge to a statute banning domestic violence misdemeanants from
possessing guns employed strict scrutiny because “the Heller Court described the right to keep
and bear arms as a fundamental right,” and “where fundamental rights are at stake, strict scrutiny
is to be applied.”112 However, when it applied strict scrutiny, the court found a compelling
government interest in the protection of domestic partners and children from gun violence.113
Further, the ban was narrowly tailored to serve this interest because it covers only those
individuals who had been “convicted of using or attempting to use physical force or threatening
to use deadly force against present and past domestic partners and children” and because
“various safeguards are established to ensure due process.”114
A smaller number of courts have offered a hybrid of strict and intermediate scrutiny as
the proper approach.115 A Seventh Circuit panel, in a decision later vacated, held that with
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regulations that “severely burden the core Second Amendment right of armed defense” in the
home, strict scrutiny is proper.116 But, for laws that do not burden this core right, intermediate
scrutiny ought to be applied.117 The Fourth Circuit subsequently adopted this hybrid approach
after the Seventh Circuit vacated its decision, holding in United States v. Chester that a domestic
violence misdemeanant is not included in the protection of the “core right” in Heller because
they are not “law-abiding citizens,” and so intermediate scrutiny ought to be applied to review
the statute (which it ultimately upheld).118
Still other courts have used a “reasonable regulation” standard to analyze gun control
laws after Heller.119 These courts ask whether a law “effectively destroys or nullifies the ability
of law-abiding people to possess a firearm for self-defense. If so, the law is unconstitutional; if
not, the law is deemed to be only a regulation, not a prohibition.”120 However, at least one
federal judge noted that because this standard is so deferential to legislatures, it could not be the
standard intended by the Heller Court.121 A reasonableness test, according to that judge, “would
subject the contested provisions to a more lenient measure of scrutiny than that envisioned by the
Heller court,” and thus could not be applied post-Heller.122
Though there is some variation, a majority of lower courts have employed intermediate
scrutiny in evaluating challenges to gun control legislation, ruling out rational basis review and
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strict scrutiny review.123 Strict scrutiny is improper, they reason, because the list of
presumptively lawful regulations outlined in Heller is not consistent with strict scrutiny
review.124 The District Court for the District of Columbia, for example, stated that strict scrutiny
“would not square” with Heller’s list of “presumptively lawful regulatory measures.”125 Using
this logic, the court in that case upheld the city’s firearms registration scheme.126 At the same
time, these courts have also found rational basis review is improper because it is too lenient a
standard for a right that a plurality of the Supreme Court has deemed a “fundamental” one. As
the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held, “some form of heightened scrutiny is necessary
in light of the fact that the right at issue is a specific, constitutionally enumerated right.”127 The
court reasoned that intermediate scrutiny struck the proper balance between the individual’s and
the government’s interests, and using that standard of review it upheld a ban on possession of
firearms in national parks.128 A large number of other courts have followed the reasoning of
these judges, settling on intermediate scrutiny to evaluate gun control laws.129
C. One-Gun-Per-Month Laws Pose a Unique Challenge to Courts
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One-gun-per-month laws pose a significant challenge to lower courts attempting to
analyze them under Heller and McDonald because they place a substantial restriction on the
individual’s ability to exercise his right to bear arms by restricting the frequency with which he
may lawfully purchase handguns. Nevertheless, an increasing number of states are enacting such
laws. The first state to enact a law restricting the legal purchase of a handgun to one every thirty
days was South Carolina in 1976 (which later repealed in 2004).130 Since then, four other states
have passed similar laws: Virginia in 1993,131 Maryland in 1996,132 California in 2000,133 and
New Jersey in 2010.134 Most recently, in 2009, Massachusetts Governor Deval Patrick
introduced a one-gun-per-month law that would require a thirty-day waiting period for handgun
purchases, but he extended it to include a waiting period for the purchase of rifles, shotguns,
firearms, machine guns, large capacity weapons, and large capacity feeding devices as well.135
The bill, however, failed to pass in the legislature before session’s end in July 2010.136
As noted in the Introduction, state legislatures have enacted one-gun-per-month laws to
prevent the flow of guns from states with weaker firearms regulations to states with stricter
firearms regulations.137 That is, the law seeks to target the “straw” purchaser who buys guns in
bulk and then resells them illegally to individuals who otherwise could not purchase a gun
legally under state law, such as criminals and minors. Opponents of one-gun-per-month laws,
however, argue that they infringe on individuals’ Second Amendment right to bear arms by
arbitrarily restricting the number of guns that they may purchase, by means that are otherwise
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legal, in a thirty-day period.138 Just last year, the Virginia state legislature voted to repeal its own
one-gun-per-month law, though it was one of the first states to enact such a law.139 Although
one-gun-per-month laws have not been challenged in court, the constitutionality of these laws is
an issue that is ripe for review in the wake of Heller and McDonald, and one that is likely to be
raised in the coming years by litigants who ascribe broad meaning to the Supreme Court’s recent
decisions.
PART III: ANALYSIS
Gun right advocates championed Heller and McDonald as landmark decisions that, once
and for all, firmly entrenched the individual right to keep and bear arms in American
jurisprudence. However, the effect of these decisions has been far more subdued. Lower courts
have been wary to read Heller and McDonald so broadly as to invalidate much existing gun
control legislation. Instead, lower court judges have cited to Heller’s list of “presumptively
lawful” regulations and upheld challenged gun control laws without much difficulty.140 As courts
are faced with challenges to regulations not mentioned in Heller’s safe harbor, however, they
will be forced to establish a constitutional standard of review to adjudicate such cases.
This Part will first show that intermediate scrutiny is the proper standard of review for
gun control laws that do not infringe on the “core right” of the individual to keep and bear arms,
as recognized in Heller and McDonald.141 Intermediate scrutiny provides the flexibility and
ability for local experimentation that the Supreme Court envisioned for such laws, but it also
acknowledges that mere rational basis review is insufficient for a specific, enumerated right.
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Then, this Part will evaluate one-gun-per-month laws under intermediate scrutiny and determine
that these laws pass constitutional muster under this heightened standard of review.142
A. Intermediate Scrutiny is the Proper Standard of Review for Gun Control Legislation
Rational basis review is too lenient a standard to apply to restrictions that impinge on a
right that the Supreme Court recognizes not only to be a “specific, enumerated right,” but a
“fundamental” one.143 Justice Scalia explicitly ruled out the rational basis approach to Second
Amendment cases in the Heller majority opinion: “[o]bviously, the [rational basis] test could not
be used to evaluate the extent to which a legislature may regulate a specific, enumerated right, be
it the freedom of speech, the guarantee against double jeopardy, the right to counsel, or the right
to keep and bear arms.”144 Thus, it does not provide the heightened standard of scrutiny that
Heller appears to require. As one federal judge noted, it is doubtful that the Heller majority
“envisioned [such a lenient standard] when it left for another day a determination of the level of
scrutiny to be applied to firearms laws.”145
Similarly, strict scrutiny is also inadequate standard for evaluating Second Amendment
challenges. It is true that in Heller and McDonald, the Supreme Court did not explicitly rule out
strict scrutiny as the proper standard of review like it did rational basis review.146 However, the
Court seems to have at least implicitly ruled out strict scrutiny as the proper approach to these
laws for a number of reasons. For one, the “presumptively lawful” gun control regulations in the
Heller “safe harbor” would likely be found unconstitutional if a court were to apply strict
scrutiny, which requires not only that the law in question serves a “compelling government
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interest,” but also that the law is “narrowly tailored” to that interest.147 These regulations
undoubtedly seek to preserve public safety, an interest that the Supreme Court has found
“compelling.”148 However, a court would likely find that they do not satisfy the narrow tailoring
requirement of the strict scrutiny test. For instance, at least one federal judge noted that felon-inpossession bans are “wildly overinclusive” because they include both violent and non-violent
felons.149 Yet, felon-in-possession bans are a category of regulations that Heller explicitly named
to be presumptively lawful.150
It is also important to note that in both Heller and McDonald, the Supreme Court
indicated not only that its holdings were not meant to disturb longstanding gun control
regulations, but that it did not wish to hinder the ability of lawmakers to create other reasonable
regulations.151 In the past, the Supreme Court has described strict scrutiny as “strict in theory, but
fatal in fact” to laws analyzed under the standard. 152 This would seem to suggest that the
Supreme Court meant for gun control regulations to be scrutinized under a more flexible
standard of review in order to keep with its statement that its holdings in Heller and McDonald
“[do] not imperil every law regulating firearms.”153 Indeed, the Fourth Circuit noted, “[w]ere we
to require strict scrutiny in circumstances such as those presented here [a challenge to a law
banning possession of loaded guns in cars in national parks], we would likely foreclose an
extraordinary number of regulatory measures, thus handcuffing lawmakers’ ability to ‘prevent [ ]
147
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armed mayhem’ in public places and depriving them of ‘a variety of tools for combating that
problem.’”154 In these circumstances, intermediate scrutiny provides a better fit.
Lastly, the Court in Heller determined that the right to bear arms is an “enumerated
right,” and most other “enumerated” rights are not analyzed under strict scrutiny.155 As Professor
Adam Winkler notes, “strict scrutiny is quite rarely applied to laws burdening the textually
guaranteed rights found in the Bill of Rights.”156 It matters not that the McDonald plurality
referred to the right to bear arms as “fundamental” when it incorporated it, for although “all
incorporated rights may be fundamental . . . not all incorporated rights trigger strict scrutiny . . . .
Strict scrutiny is only used in doctrines of two incorporated provisions of the Bill of Rights: the
First and Fifth Amendments.”157 Strict scrutiny is not employed, for example, when analyzing
claims under the Fourth Amendment prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures158 or the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel.159 In addition, the Second Amendment lacks the absolute
language that we find in the First Amendment, which does employ strict scrutiny in certain
circumstances: “Congress shall make no law. . . ”160 Instead, the Court in Heller made clear that
the right to bear arms “is not unlimited,” and it is “not a right to keep and carry any weapon
whatsoever in any manner whatsoever for whatever purpose.”161 Thus, it seems unlikely that the
Second Amendment requires strict scrutiny analysis where there is no “strict” language like that
found in the First Amendment.
In sum, intermediate scrutiny provides the heightened level of review for such a
fundamental right, as required by Heller, but it is not so restrictive as to invalidate those
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“presumptively lawful” regulations that Heller expressly endorses. These presumptively lawful
regulations would likely survive intermediate scrutiny. Promoting public safety is undoubtedly
an important government interest (indeed, as noted above, the Supreme Court has found it to be a
“compelling” interest),162 and courts will likely find regulations like those in the Heller safe
harbor to be “substantially” related to the efforts to protect safety and to reduce gun-related
violence.163
B. Applying Intermediate Scrutiny, One-Gun-Per-Month Laws Pass Constitutional Muster
State legislatures have enacted one-gun-per-month laws to reduce the number of guns
that enter the illegal firearms market and, more generally, to restrict the flow of interstate
firearms trafficking.164 Much of the legislation aimed at illegal firearms trafficking has focused
on handguns, like one-gun-per-month laws.165 Illegal firearms trafficking across state lines is a
serious problem in the United States, in part because firearms sales are regulated at the state
level; there is no federal law that limits the number of handguns that an individual may purchase
at one time.166 States that have weaker firearms laws attract traffickers, who may make multiple
purchases of guns and then resell them in states with stricter firearms laws.167 Multiple gun sales
are of particular concern, for studies have shown that handguns sold in multiple sales to a single
purchaser are the type of weapon most frequently used in the commission of crimes.168
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Furthermore, the federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms found in 2000 that 20% of all
retail handguns recovered in crimes were purchased as part of a multiple sale.169 Thus, one-gunper-month laws seek to rectify a real problem that contributes to gun-related violence
nationwide.
In the wake of Heller and McDonald, it is unclear what level of scrutiny judges ought to
apply should one-gun-per-month laws be challenged in court. The Supreme Court, as noted
above, has made clear that mere rational basis review would be inappropriate for such
legislation.170 In order for one-gun-per-month laws to pass constitutional muster, then, they must,
at a minimum, serve an important government interest and be substantially related to achieving
that interest. It is unlikely that one-gun-per-month laws, like the other presumptively lawful gun
control regulations, would survive strict scrutiny.171 A court would most likely find, using strict
scrutiny analysis, that although these laws seek to serve a compelling government interest (that
is, protecting public safety), they fail the “narrow tailoring” requirement.
However, as this Note has indicated, strict scrutiny is not the proper standard to apply to
gun control legislation like one-gun-per-month laws. Instead, courts faced with challenges to the
constitutionality of one-gun-per-month laws should use intermediate scrutiny analysis. That is,
these laws need only serve an important government interest and to be substantially related to
that interest.172 There are certainly a number of important government interests associated with
limiting the right to bear arms, the most substantial of which is the interest in preserving public
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safety and preventing violence.173 Studies have shown that gun violence is indeed a major
problem in the United States—in 2010, it was estimated that someone dies by gun violence every
seventeen minutes and over 70,000 Americans are shot non-fatally every year.174 One-gun-permonth laws seek to remedy this problem by stemming the illegal flow of handguns into the hands
of potential criminals. A court would therefore have little trouble finding that one-gun-per-month
laws serve an important government interest.
It is the next step of the inquiry—whether the laws are substantially related to that
government interest—that requires a bit more analysis. Research shows that one-gun-per-month
laws have been effective where enacted.175 Though now repealed, Virginia’s one-gun-per-month
law provides a useful case study: the state adopted its one-gun-per-month law in 1993 after
studies indicated that it was a “primary source” of guns recovered from crime scenes in the
northeastern United States.176 After the law was adopted, the number of guns traced to Virginia
dealers dropped by 71% in New York, 72% in Massachusetts, and 66% in New Jersey, New
York, Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Massachusetts combined.177 To be sure, such research is
not conclusive, but intermediate scrutiny only requires that the law substantially achieve its
intended goal, not that it is a perfect fit.
Furthermore, it is important to note that in states with more urban areas where gun
violence is a significant problem, the “substantial” relationship between one-gun-per-month laws
173
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and promoting public safety may be more readily clear than in states with fewer urban areas.
Thus, a New Jersey court could find that such a relationship exists, whereas an Alaska court may
not. Justice Alito, writing for the plurality in McDonald, encouraged consideration of “local
needs and values” when evaluating state and local gun control laws.178 Intermediate scrutiny
provides the flexibility to allow courts to consider these local factors in order to determine
whether one-gun-per-month laws provide the substantial fit needed to serve the interest in
preventing gun violence in the particular jurisdiction.
PART IV: CONCLUSION
For nearly 200 hundred years, the right to bear arms was one that was ill defined and on
which the Supreme Court had failed to take an affirmative stance. At long last, with the Heller
and McDonald decisions in 2008 and 2010, the Court took an affirmative stance and defined the
Second Amendment: the right of an individual to keep and bear arms in the home for selfdefense purposes. Initially, gun rights advocates heralded Heller and McDonald as “landmark”
decisions. However, because the Court cautioned that the Second Amendment is “not unlimited”
and refused to invalidate “longstanding” and “presumptively lawful” gun control regulations, it
is unclear how far this right to keep and bear arms extends. Since Heller and McDonald,
hundreds of cases have been brought at the state and federal level to challenge gun control
legislation, and there has been no consensus on how the courts ought to evaluate these laws.
This Note proposes that intermediate scrutiny should be the standard that guides courts in
reviewing gun control laws that regulate the right to keep and bear arms. Rational basis is too
lenient a standard for a right that the Supreme Court has named to be an enumerated,
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fundamental right. On the other hand, strict scrutiny is inappropriate for a right that the Supreme
Court has also said is “not unlimited” and not immune to regulation by federal and state gun
control laws. Intermediate scrutiny strikes the proper balance: it provides the heightened level of
review that is necessary to protect individuals’ interests in this fundamental right, but it also
allows the government to protect its own interest in promoting public safety and reducing gunrelated violence. Under intermediate scrutiny, many gun control regulations that seek to promote
these government interests, such as one-gun-per-month laws, would pass constitutional muster.
When the Supreme Court does decide to address the difficult issue of which standard of review
to apply to Second Amendment questions, it should keep in mind not only the interests of the
individuals who wish to keep and bear arms, but the interests of the government in promoting
public safety as well.
In the coming years, lower courts are likely to continue to disagree on what level of
scrutiny ought to be applied in Second Amendment cases. Though litigation will help to refine
the scope and limits of the Second Amendment right to bear arms, until the Supreme Court
decides to rule definitively on it, the fate of gun control regulations in the United States remains
unclear.

